Slides from Dtu Management about Power Economics III: Security of Supply and Market Design, Reserve Power Markets. The Pdf, suitable for university-level Economics students, covers balancing energy, its usage sequence during disturbances, and an overview of balancing power qualities.
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There are many definitions. We will use this one:
Security of Supply: Security of supply exists when electricity Reliability consumers are able to obtain electricity of defined quality when they need it, at cost- reflective and transparent prices
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Reliability Adequacy Security Investments
Adequacy The ability of the electric system to supply the energy demand at all times, considering scheduled and unscheduled outages of system elements.
Security The ability of the electric system to withstand sudden disturbances.
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Load Marginal Costs Margi nal Costs 1 Contribution margin to cover fix costs Volume Load Contribution margin to cover fix costs Volume
Marginal Costs Load Contribution margin to cover fix costs Volume
Peak prices: when demand sets the price, peaker power plants can earn contribution margins to cover fix costs and capex
Value of Loss Load (VoLL) Price /MWh Demand curves $1000 -1 $30 Supply curve $18 Demand curves QJ = 4 GW Qa = 8 GW
Definition Monetary indicator expressing the costs associated with an interruption of electricity supply.
What is your Value of Loss Load?
Mentimeter: www.menti.com Code: 3339 2326
A peak power plant with an annual capex of 100k€/MW should be financed via contribution margins earned in the hours when demand (VoLL) sets the electricity price of the market. How many VoLL-prices do we need to finance a new peak capacity investment? Assumption: p = VoLL = 1000 €/MWh Annual capex of investment: 100 k€/MW Cvar = 100 €/MWh
A peak power plant with an annual capex of 100k€/MW should be financed via contribution margins earned in the hours when demand (VoLL) sets the electricity price of the market. How many VoLL-prices do we need to finance a new peak capacity investment? Assumption: p = VoLL = 1000 €/MWh Annual capex of investment: 100 k€/MW Cvar = 100 €/MWh Capex Capex #hours = Margins p - Cvar 100.000€/MW = = 111 h (1000 - 100)€/MWh
The electricity market in still functions today as an Energy-only Market in many countries
The marginal cost market does not clarify the remuneration of the "last power plant"
MC [€/MWh] demand p * Missing-Money = (p*3 - Pmax) · X3 Pma P2 Gas turbine CCGT Coal p1 Lignite coal i Nuclear X1 X2 X3 · Price caps to avoid market power abuse in oligopolistic markets · Missing contribution margins to cover fix or capital costs [MW] supply
MC [€/MWh] supply demand p* Missing-Money = (p*3 - Pmax) · X3 Pma P2 țunine CCGT Coal p1 Lignite coal i Nuclear X1 X2 X3 . Price caps to avoid market power abuse in oligopolistic markets . Missing contribution margins to cover fix or capital costs · Market design discussions started already in the early 2000es (Oren 2000, Joskow and Tirole 2000) [MW]
Energy-only Market
Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms
Capacity provision Capacity payment Capacity market Levy of capacity payments Electricity supply Capacity providers (supply, storage, flexible demand) Retailers End consumers End consumer electricity price Electricity supply Wholesale electricity price Electricity supply Wholesale electricity price Wholesale electricity market (EOM)
Collection of arguments for the "Energy-only market (EOM)":
Arguments for a Capacity Remunaration Mechanism:
low 1 Simple capacity subsidy Complexity 2 Index- based capacity payment medium 3 Strategic Reserve Description · Direct investment subsidy for new construction · Demand conditions possibly specified (e.g. type of plant, operator) · Direct payment for equipment provision based on a shortage index · Criteria: Availability, existing capacity, seasonal factors · Some x% of the generation capacity is taken out of the market and reserved for critical periods (spike prices) · Remuneration for this part of the capacity in the system Declaration · Mechanism is often linked to other policy objectives (e.g. environmental objectives) · System used in Spain and Ireland · Objective: To ensure the availability of existing plants in case of high demand · Model established in Germany and Sweden/Finland, to ensure peak load • Model refers to generation plants that might be mothballed and demand side management
Description medium 4 Capacity Tender · Premium for the provision of new plants to compensate for missing contribution margins (missing money) · Tendering via auction procedure · Trading options on power plant capacities against option premium · Realisation of option in case market price > strike price 6 high Capacity market · Fully developed capacity market with target capacities defined by central planner • Bidding process for secure generation and load management against capacity constraints Declaration · Proposed as part of the debate in Germany in 2014 · Applied in many countries with growing demand · Model launched in Brazil, Columbia Complexity Realiability Options 5 · Enables hedging against price spikes in the market · Processes introduced in the USA (PJM, NE-NO) · In USA secondary market tur Guarantee of long-term flexibility
Stand-by cost 1 Including levy of strategic reserve cost Strategic reserve Activation cost Central regulatory body Electricity supply Fee for strategic reserve cost Capacity providers (supply, storage, flexible demand) Electricit y supply Retailers End consumers End consumer electricity price1 Electricit y supply Wholesale electricity price Electricity supply Wholesale electricity price Wholesale electricity market (EOM)
1 Simple capacity subsidy 2 Index- based capacity payment 3 Strategic Reserve Advantages · High transparency · Simple implementation · Possible national implementation · Regional focus possible · Economically efficient by including existing plants · Flexible to design/adapt · Small market intervention Disadvantages · Effectiveness not guaranteed · Disturbance of the profitability of existing plants · Strong market intervention · Index formation not transparent · Compensation is difficult to determine · Strong market intervention · Can be used to avoid peak prices > Possibility of market intervention · Danger of underused capacities